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The Alien Criminal Defendant:
Sentencing Considerations
STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY*
When an alien is convicted of a criminal offense, the judge's
sentencing decision often predetermines whether the alien
will subsequently be deported. The deportation consequence
is frequently inadvertent and can be more agonizing than the
criminal sentence itself, particularly when the alien is a law-
fully admitted permanent resident. After summarizing exist-
ing law, this Article analyzes the policy considerations under-
lying the deportation of alien convicts and draws conclusions
as to the circumstances under which the additional sanction
of deportation is justifiable. The author then proposes ways in
which Congress, sentencing judges, and counsel can rectify
many of the current problems in this area.
INTRODUCTION
When a person has been convicted of a criminal offense, the sen-
tencing judge must ordinarily consider a wide range of factors in
determining what sentence should be imposed. If the convict is an
alien, the job of the sentencing judge is complicated by the presence
of an additional consideration: whether the sentence imposed will
subject the alien to deportation. To the permanent resident alien, this
consequence may be even more important than the criminal punish-
ment itself.
It is an anomaly of American immigration law that the sentencing
judge-in federal and state courts alike-frequently makes the real
* B.S., Worcester Polytechnic Institute, 1969; Associateship, Society of Ac-
tuaries, 1973; J.D., University of San Diego School of Law, 1977. Mr. Legomsky
served as student director of the University of San Diego Immigration Law
Clinic and is presently conducting postgraduate research in comparative im-
migration law at the University of Oxford.
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decision on whether an alien convict is to be deported. Because the
anomaly is largely unrecognized, this decision is often made unwit-
tingly, without regard to whether such a sanction is desirable in the
individual case.
This Article begins with a description of the existing law, detailing
the specific ways in which Congress has delegated to the sentencing
judge the authority to predetermine whether the alien convict will be
deported. The second section examines the propriety of deporting an
alien already subject to criminal sanctions for criminal conduct. The
final section identifies deficiencies in the existing law and proposes
ways in which those problems can be at least partially resolved.
EXISTING LAW: How THE DECISION OF THE SENTENCING JUDGE
DETERMINES WHETHER THE ALIEN SUBSEQUENTLY
WILL BE DEPORTED
Overview of the Applicable Deportation Provisions and
Limitations on the Scope of this Article
The United States immigration laws set forth eighteen grounds
upon which an alien can be deported from the United States.' Al-
though public attention has recently focused primarily on the so-
called illegal alien, it must be stressed that the statutory language is
not confined to aliens who entered unlawfully.2 Thus aliens who have
been lawfully admitted for permanent residence and who have com-
plied with all provisions of the immigration laws become deportable
if they fit within any of the enumerated grounds, regardless of the
duration of residence.
One such ground is contained in 8 U.S.C.A. section 1251(a)(4),
which provides for the deportation of any alien who
is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within
five years after entry and either sentenced to confinement or confined
therefor in a prison or corrective institution, for a year or more, or
who at any time after entry is convicted of two crimes involving moral
turpitude, not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct,
regardless of whether confined therefor and regardless of whether the
convictions were in a single trial.3
This Article concerns the effect of the sentencing judge's decision
on the alien's susceptibility to deportation. Because of the nature of
the topic, several limitations on the scope of this Article should be
noted at the outset. First, there are several provisions other than
1. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(a), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a) (West
Supp. 1977) [The Immigration and Nationality Act is hereinafter cited as I. & N.
Act].
2. Id. The statute mandates the deportation of "any alien in the United
States" who commits specified acts.
3. Id. § 241(a)(4), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a)(4).
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section 1251(a)(4) which call for the deportation of aliens convicted
of specified crimes. These crimes include violation of certain provi-
sions of the Alien Registration Act,4 possession of specified weapons,'
and, most importantly, almost any marijuana or narcotics-related
offense.6 In none of these provisions is duration or type of sentence an
essential element; they are therefore beyond the scope of this discus-
sion.7
Second, section 125 l(a)(4) is bifurcated: The first part relates to the
alien who has been convicted of only one crime involving moral
turpitude. It requires that the alien be sentenced to confinement, or
actually confined, for at least one year as a condition to deportation.
In contrast, the second part relates to the alien who has been convict-
ed of two crimes involving moral turpitude and contains no sentenc-
ing requirement. Because the sentence imposed is irrelevant when
deportation is predicated on the second part of section 1251(a)(4),
much of this discussion will apply only to the first part.
Finally, within the first part of section 1251(a)(4), several ele-
ments other than the sentence are required. Legal issues often arise
about what constitutes a final conviction,8 what the term crime
4. See id. § 241(a)(5), (15), (16), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(5), (15), (16) (1970).
5. The weapons referred to are automatic and semi-automatic weapons and
sawed-off shotguns. Id. § 241(a)(14), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(14).
6. Id. § 241(a)(11), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(11). There exist a few rare marijua-
na or narcotics offenses which do not give rise to deportation under this subsec-
tion. See, e.g., Varga v. Rosenberg, 237 F. Supp. 282 (S.D. Cal. 1964) (being under
the influence of marijuana); In re Schunck, 14 1. & N. Dec. 101 (1972) (knowingly
being in a place where narcotic drugs are used); In re Sum, 13 I. & N. Dec. 569
(1970) (using marijuana). Similarly, the Board of Immigration Appeals has held
that LSD is not a narcotic for purposes of § 1251(a)(11). In re Abreu-Semino, 12 1.
& N. Dec. 775 (1968).
7. Although marijuana and narcotics offenses are included in the list of
grounds beyond the scope of this Article, they will be discussed briefly in
connection with one of the recommendations made in the final section. See text
accompanying notes 166-70 & 175-76 infra.
For a comprehensive discussion of the strategies available to the criminal law
practitioner representing an alien defendant, including the plea-bargaining and
post-conviction phases, in both moral turpitude cases and narcotics cases, see
MANUAL OF NATIONAL CENTER FOR STUDY OF ALIENS' RIGHTS (San Diego, Cal., in
press).
8. One threshold issue, for example, is whether the term conviction was
intended to be defined by federal or state law. Although the federal definition
has generally been followed, Will v. INS, 447 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1971); Gutierrez v.
INS, 323 F.2d 593 (9th Cir. 1963), state law is occasionally considered. Pino v.
Landon, 349 U.S. 921 (1955). For a comprehensive definition of conviction, see
In re L.R., 8 I. & N. Dec. 269, 270 (1959).
More specific issues often arise regarding the finality of a conviction. Coin-
means,9 which crimes involve moral turpitude,0 and even whether
the crime has been committed within five years after entry." Any of
these issues could consume an entire article; the primary focus of this
Article, however, is sentencing considerations.
Defining the Sentence12
As noted above, one essential element of deportation, according to
section 1251(a)(4), is that the alien be "either sentenced to confine-
plicating factors include the pending of a direct appeal, Will v. INS, 447 F.2d 529
(7th Cir. 1971); the possibility of successful collateral proceedings, Hernandez-
Valensuela v. Rosenberg, 304 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1962); In re A.F., 8 I. & N. Dec.
429 (1959); the effect of diversion under 21 U.S.C. § 844(b) (1970) or in California
under CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1000(a), 1000.2 (West Supp. 1977); and the effect of
expungement pursuant to the Federal Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-
5026 (1970), the California Youth Authority Act, CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 1700
(West 1972), and the various state adult expungement statutes. See, e.g., ARIz.
REv. STAT. ANN § i3-1744 (West Supp. 1976); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1203.4, 1203.4a
(West 1970).
9. In this context the most frequently litigated issues appear to be those
relating to commission of unlawful acts by juveniles. Although juvenile pro-
ceedings have been held not to give rise to a crime for immigration purposes (In
re C.M., 5 I. & N. Dec. 327 (1953); In re O.N., 2 I. & N. Dec. 319 (1945)), a juvenile
tried in adult proceedings has been held so convicted. In re C.M., 5 I. & N. Dec.
327 (1953).
10. Various definitions of moral turpitude have been advanced. The one
commonly followed is that in Ng Sui Wing v. United States, 46 F.2d 755, 756 (7th
Cir. 1931). For a thorough compilation of those crimes which have been held to
involve, and those held not to involve, moral turpitude, see 1 C. GORDON & H.
ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 4.14 (Supp. 1975).
11. The definition of entry has given rise to a number of complex issues,
surfacing most frequently in the situation where an alien who has already been
lawfully admitted subsequently departs from the United States temporarily and
then returns. Under certain circumstances the return may be held not to consti-
tute an entry. See I. & N. Act § 101(a)(15), 8 U.S.C.A. § l101(a)(15) (West Supp.
1977), as construed in the leading case of Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963).
For a discussion of the Fleuti doctrine, see Comment, Exclusion and Deporta-
tion of Resident Aliens: The Re-entry Doctrine and the Need for Reform, 13
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 192 (1975).
12. The discussion in this section relates to the effect which the terms of the
sentence will have on the alien's deportation. However, there are immigration-
related consequences other than deportation which may flow from the nature
and duration of the sentence imposed. One such consequence is exclusion-that
is, denial of admission. There are 32 grounds upon which an alien trying to enter
the United States can be excluded; subject to the qualifications mentioned in
note 11 supra, these grounds apply to the permanent resident alien who has left
the country temporarily and seeks to reenter. I. & N. Act § 212(a), 8 U.S.C.A. §
1182(a) (West Supp. 1977). One such ground for exclusion is previous conviction
of two or more offenses for which the "aggregate sentences to confinement
actually imposed were five years or more." Id. § 212(a)(10), 8 U.S.C.A. §
1182(a)(10). Because no time limit is specified in § 1182(a)(10), the alien who
has been sentenced to five years or more is effectively precluded from ever
leaving the country unless he intends never to return. Accordingly, the sentenc-
ing judge may wish to consider the effect the sentence will have on the alien's
future mobility.
Another immigration-related consequence of the sentence is that regarding
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ment or confined therefor in a prison or corrective institution, for a
year or more." A number of important issues have arisen in interpret-
ing this element.
Several issues relate to the broad question of what constitutes a
sentence to confinement for a year or more. In the leading case of In
re V.,13 an alien had been convicted in a New York state court. The
court sentenced the alien to two-and-a-half to five years in state
prison, but suspended imposition of the sentence as a condition of
probation. The Board of Immigration Appeals first held that proba-
tion is not a sentence to confinement for purposes of section
1251(a)(4). Furthermore, it held that a sentence, the imposition of
which has been suspended, is not a sentence to confinement. 4
By contrast, when only the execution of the sentence has been
suspended, it has been held that a sentence to confinement exists." In
Velez-Lozano v. INS, for instance, the court said "[t]he essential
element . . . is the imposition of sentence rather than the actual
serving of sentence."' 6
Like the New York statute under which the alien had been sentenc-
ed in In re V., California Penal Code section 1203.1 authorizes the
court granting probation to suspend either the imposition or the
execution of sentence.' Such suspension may be granted only pur-
naturalization. Pursuant to its constitutional authority to regulate naturaliza-
tion, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4, Congress has imposed as a condition of
naturalization the requirement that the applicant have resided in the United
States, and have been of "good moral character," for at least five years preced-
ing the filing of the application. I. & N. Act § 316(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (1970). A
further provision precludes a finding of good moral character when the alien is
"confined, as a result of conviction, to a penal institution for an aggregate period
of one hundred and eighty days or more." Id. § 101(f)(7), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(7).
Thus, if a permanent resident alien is approaching the end of his five-year
statutory eligibility period for naturalization, the sentencing judge may wish to
consider the impact of a sentence of 180 days or more.
13. 7 I. & N. Dec. 577 (1957).
14. Id. at 578. Accord, Velez-Lozano v. INS, 463 F.2d 1305 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(dictum).
15. Velez-Lozano v. INS, 463 F.2d 1305 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Wood v. Hoy, 266 F.2d
825 (9th Cir. 1959); In re M., 6 I. & N. Dec. 346 (1954).
16. 463 F.2d 1305, 1307 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
17. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.1 (West 1970). See also id. § 1203(a), which permits
the court in a misdemeanor case to suspend either imposition or execution of
sentence. At least one court has held that § 1203(a) has not been impliedly
repealed by enactment of § 1203.1. People v. Rye, 140 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 962, 296
P.2d 126 (1956).
suant to statutory authority 8 and only as an incident to probation.10
For certain crimes, however, probation is statutorily precluded,20 and
when it is, neither suspension of imposition of sentence nor suspen-
sion of execution of sentence is permitted. 21 Therefore, when suspen-
sion is permitted, and when the court wishes to grant it to an alien
who has been convicted, the choice to suspend imposition or execu-
tion of sentence should be a conscious one.
Another interpretation problem arising from the one-year sentence
provision is the effect of premature release. In Burr v. Edgar,22 an
alien had been sentenced to one year of imprisonment in the county
jail. Under the California law then in effect, a prisoner was eligible
for up to ten days credit for each month served, awarded on the basis
of good behavior and work performance.2 3 The Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, reasoning that measurement of the one-year
period is controlled by the length of the sentence rather than by the
actual time served, held there had been a one-year "sentence to
confinement."
Concurrent sentences may pose another measurement problem. In
In re Fernandez24 the alien defendant had been convicted of two
counts of transporting forged securities. 2 The court sentenced him to
three years in prison on each count, with the two sentences to be
served concurrently. Under one of the exclusionary provisions of the
immigration law,26 an alien may not be admitted to the United States
if he or she has been convicted of two or more offenses for which the
aggregate "sentences to confinement" actually imposed is five years
or more. The Board of Immigration Appeals held that when concur-
rent sentences have been imposed, the actual time of the sentence
rather than the total of the various sentences is counted. 7 Although
the question arose in the context of an exclusionary provision requir-
ing sentences aggregating five years of duration, there is no reason to
expect that the decision would have been different had the question
related to the one-year sentence provision of section 1251(a)(4).
18. People v. Brown, 111 Cal. App. 2d 406, 244 P.2d 702 (1952).
19. Oster v. Municipal Court, 45 Cal. 2d 134, 287 P.2d 755 (1955); People v.
Brandon, 166 Cal. App. 2d 96, 332 P.2d 708 (1959); People v. McGillis, 166 Cal.
App. 2d 91, 332 P.2d 706 (1959); People v. Cravens, 115 Cal. App. 2d 201,251 P.2d
717 (1953).
20. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1203(a), 1203.06, 1203.07 (West Supp. 1976).
21. See, e.g., id. §§ 1203.06, 1203.07.
22. 292 F.2d 593 (9th Cir. 1961).
23. The court cited CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 4019, 4019.2 (West 1956).
24. 14 I. & N. Dec. 24 (1972).
25. Prosecution was pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1970).
26. I. & N. Act § 212(a)(10), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(10) (1970).
27. 14 I. & N. Dec. at 25.
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Indeterminate sentences present another problem. It appears to be
settled that an indeterminate sentence potentially lasting more than
one year is deemed to be a sentence of more than one year for
purposes of section 1251(a)(4), even if the convict is actually released
before serving a one year term.28 In California the enactment of the
comprehensive Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act of 1976,29 ef-
fective July 1, 1977,30 will eliminate many of the problems formerly
associated with the indeterminate sentence. Under the new Act,
felonies not punishable by life imprisonment or death will carry
fixed sentences.'
It should be noted that not all felonies are crimes involving moral
turpitude for purposes of the immigration laws.32 Conversely, not all
crimes involving moral turpitude are felonies.33 Thus, the sentencing
considerations discussed here will often apply even when the crime
of which the accused has been convicted is a misdemeanor not cover-
ed by the new Act.34
The preceding discussion focused on the requirement of a sentence
to confinement of one year or more. A second group of issues arises
from the requirement that this sentence entail confinement to a
"prison or corrective institution. ' 3 5 It is undisputed that when con-
victs are imprisoned in county jails as a condition of probation,6 they
have been sentenced to a "prison or corrective institution" for im-
migration purposes.37
Another question which has arisen in this context is whether a
28. See, e.g., Petsche v. Clingan, 273 F.2d 688 (10th Cir. 1960); United States ex
rel. Kiobge v. Day, 42 F.2d 716 (S.D.N.Y. 1929).
29. 1976 Cal. Stats., ch. 1139.
30. Id. § 351.5.
31. Id. For a thorough discussion of the new Uniform Determinate Sentenc-
ing Act, see Comment, Senate Bill 42 and the Myth of Shortened Sentences for
California Offenders: The Effects of the Uniform Determinate Sentencing
Act, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1176 (1977).
32. United States ex rel. Mongiovi v. Karnuth, 30 F.2d 825 (W.D.N.Y. 1929).
33. Gonzales v. Barber, 207 F.2d 398 (9th Cir.), aff'd, 347 U.S. 637 (1953);
Tillinghast v. Edmead, 31 F.2d 81 (1st Cir. 1929).
34. See generally Legislative Counsel's Digest, 9 CAL. LEGIS. SERVICE 4752,
4753 (West 1976) (commenting on revision of punishments for felonies).
35. I. & N. Act § 241(a)(4), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a)(4) (West Supp. 1977).
36. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.1 (West Supp. 1976).
37. Burr v. INS, 350 F.2d 87 (9th Cir. 1965); Burr v. Edgar, 292 F.2d 593 (9th
Cir. 1961); United States ex rel. Fells v. Garfinkel, 158 F. Supp. 524 (W.D. Pa.
1957), aff'd, 251 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1958).
sentence under the Federal Youth Corrections Act38 constitutes con-
finement in a prison or corrective institution. Under this Act a youth
offender, defined as "a person under the age of twenty-two years at
the time of conviction, ' '39 may be committed to the custody of the
Attorney General in lieu of adult prison.4" In In re V.4 1 an alien youth
convicted of embezzlement42 had been sentenced under the Act. The
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) instituted deportation
proceedings on the ground that he had been convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude within five years after entering the United
States and had been sentenced to confinement in a prison or correc-
tive institution for one year or more. The alien argued that a sentence
under the Federal Youth Corrections Act does not constitute such a
"prison or corrective institution." The Board of Immigration Appeals
held for the alien, emphasizing the Act's repeated references to treat-
ment rather than punishment. 3 Thus the rule appears to be that
commitment to the custody of the Attorney General pursuant to the
Federal Youth Corrections Act cannot satisfy the sentence require-
ment of section 1251(a)(4).,
Under California's Youth Authority Act 45 a person who is under
age twenty-one when apprehended4 6 may be committed to the
California Youth Authority in lieu of adult prison. The express pur-
pose of the Act is to substitute methods of training and treatment for
retributive punishment.47 The Board of Immigration Appeals, over-
38. 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-5026 (1970).
39. Id. § 5006(e).
40. Id. § 5010.
41. 8 I. & N. Dec. 360 (1959).
42. The conviction was pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 657 (1970).
43. See, e.g., id. §§ 5006(f), 5006(g), 5010, 5011. The Board's holding went to the
issue of whether the requirement of a one-year sentence to a prison or corrective
institution had been satisfied. It refrained from deciding a second issue:
whether the possibility of expungement, pursuant to id. § 5021, precluded a
finding of a final conviction. 8 1. & N. Dec. at 362. That issue would be critical in
cases where the sentence is not an essential element of the deportable offense.
Examples of such situations would arise when deportation is predicated upon
the second part of § 1251(a)(4)-that is, two convictions of crimes involving moral
turpitude-or when it is grounded on some other deportable offense requiring a
conviction but not a specified sentence. See, e.g., I. & N. Act § 241(a)(11), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a)(11) (1970) (marijuana or narcotics conviction). In an analogous case,
Adams v. United States, 299 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1962), the court held that a
conviction followed by commitment to the California Youth Authority, although
not a sentence for purposes of § 1251(a)(4), was nevertheless a final "conviction"
on which deportation for a narcotics offense could be based.
44. Hernandez-Valensuela v. Rosenberg, 304 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1962).
45. The Youth Authority Act is the official name. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §
1701 (West 1972).
46. Id. § 1731.5. It should be noted that the age is measured at time of ap-
prehension. Under the federal act, by contrast, the age is 22 and is measured at
time of conviction. 18 U.S.C. § 5006(e) (1970).
47. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 1700 (West 1972).
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ruling prior law,48 held that commitment to the California Youth
Authority does not constitute a sentence to confinement in a prison
or corrective institution.4 9
Commitment to various other types of corrective institutions often
raises issues about whether the sentencing requirement has been met.
The Board has ruled that commitment to the federal Public Health
Service hospital following a conviction constitutes a sentence to a
prison or corrective institution,"0 and at least one judicial decision is
in accord.5 ' In reaching its decision, however, the Board emphasized
that under the federal statute authorizing this commitment 52 the
imprisonment was to continue even after the convict had been medi-
cally cured. 3 Similar opinions concerning state mental hospital com-
mitments have been written.
5 4
In cases where the principal purpose of the commitment has been
found to be treatment rather than punishment, the results have been
precisely the opposite. Thus, commitment pursuant to the New Jersey
Sex Offenders Act, 5 under which the court is prohibited from
specifying a minimum detention period, has been held not to consti-
tute a sentence to confinement in a prison or corrective institution.
5 6
The same is true of commitments to a state mental hospital57 and
even of commitments to a state vocational training school for youth
offenders.5 8
The Judicial Recommendation Against Deportation
The preceding section described how the sentence actually im-
posed may affect an alien's immigration status. By considering these
effects, a sentencing judge who wishes to avoid subjecting a particu-
lar alien to deportation may decide to tailor the sentence accordingly.
48. In re C.R., 4 I. & N. Dec. 136 (1950).
49. In re N., 8 I. & N. Dec. 660 (1960).
50. In re A., 5 I. & N. Dec. 52 (1953).
51. United States ex rel. Abbenante v. Butterfield, 112 F. Supp. 324 (E.D.
Mich. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 212 F.2d 794 (6th Cir. 1954).
52. 42 U.S.C. §§ 257, 259 (1970).
53. In re A., 5 I. & N. Dec. 52, 55 (1953).
54. In re V., 7I. & N. Dec. 242 (1956) (commitment as sexual psychopath); In re
B., 5 I. & N. Dec. 538 (1953) (commitment as defective delinquent).
55. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 164-6 (West 1971).
56. Holzapfel v. Wyrsch, 259 F.2d 890 (3d Cir. 1958); In re M., 8 1. & N. Dec. 256(1959).
57. In re K., 3 I. & N. Dec. 48 (1947).
58. In re S., 4 I. & N. Dec. 544 (1951).
In many situations, however, the sentencing judge may believe that
the circumstances call for a sentence of more than one year and that
suspension of the imposition of sentence would not be warranted. At
the same time, he or she may wish to avoid adding the harsh penalty
of deportation to an already substantial punishment, particularly if
deportation would destroy the alien's family ties. In such situations,
the sentencing judge has a simple statutory mechanism for imposing
the sentence he or she believes the alien deserves, without addition-
ally causing deportation. The device is called the judicial recom-
mendation against deportation. The pertinent statutory language
reads:
The provisions of [section 1251(a)(4)] respecting the deportation of
an alien convicted of a crime or crimes shall not apply ... if the court
sentencing such alien for such crime shall make, at the time of first
imposing judgment or passing sentence, or within thirty days there-
after, a recommendation to the Attorney General that such alien not
be deported, due notice having been given prior to making such rec-
ommendation to representatives of the interested state, the [Immigra-
tion and Naturalization] Service, and prosecution authorities, who
shall be granted an opportunity to make representations in the
matter.
59
It should be noted that the judicial recommendation applies to
each of the two parts of section 1251(a)(4). Thus, unlike the sentenc-
ing considerations discussed in the preceding section, the recom-
mendation should be considered regardless of the number of convic-
tions the alien has had.
Although the judicial recommendation against deportation has
been in force since 1917,60 it appears to be generally unknown to both
courts and counsel,6 ' as the tragic results of the cases discussed in
this section will show. One commentator, now a member of the Board
of Immigration Appeals, has said that "no factor is more consistently
overlooked in presentencing considerations."62
The power of the judicial recommendation against deportation lies
in its absolutely binding nature. Once the "recommendation" is is-
sued by the sentencing judge, the alien cannot be deported on the
basis of the conviction for which he or she is being sentenced.6 3
59. I. & N. Act § 241(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b)(2) (1970).
60. Act of Feb. 5, 1917, Pub. L. No. 84-728, ch. 29, § 19, 39 Stat. 874.
61. See Appleman, The Recommendation Against Deportation, 50 INTERPRE-
TER RELEASES 132 (1973). See also In re Marin, 13 1. & N. Dec. 497 (1970), aff'd sub
nom. Marin v. INS, 438 F.2d 932 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 923 (1971).
62. See Appleman, supra note 61, at 137.
63. Velez-Lozano v. INS, 463 F.2d 1305, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Haller v. Esper-
dy, 397 F.2d 211,213 (2d Cir. 1968); United States ex rel. DeLuca v. O'Rourke, 213
F.2d 759 (8th Cir. 1954); United States ex rel. Santarelli v. Hughes, 116 F.2d 613,
616 (3d Cir. 1940).
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Furthermore, if the alien subsequently leaves the United States and
attempts to return, the recommendation will prevent the INS from
excluding 4 him or her on the basis of the conviction.65
There is one major limitation on the scope of the judicial recom-
mendation against deportation. By its own terms it prevents only
those deportations which are predicated on section 1251(a)(4)-that
is, conviction of one or more crimes involving moral turpitude.6 6 For
example, when deportation is grounded on section 1251(a)(11)-con-
viction of a marijuana or narcotics-related offense-the recom-
mendation will have no effect.67
The judicial recommendation against deportation will be invalid
unless the statutory prerequisites of notice and timing are scrupu-
lously honored. Although the device is very easy to apply, the failure
to apply it properly is costly. The following discussion describes the
two major prerequisites: timely notice to all interested parties, and
timely issuance of the recommendation by the sentencing judge.
Timely Notice to Interested Parties
One statutory prerequisite of an effective judicial recommendation
against deportation is that "due notice [be] given prior to making
such recommendation to representatives of the interested state, the
Service, and prosecution authorities, who shall be granted an oppor-
tunity to make representations in the matter."68 It has been held
repeatedly that a recommendation issued without such prior notice is
64. With two very narrow exceptions, an alien is excludable if he or she has
been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. I. & N. Act § 212(a)(9), 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9) (1970).
65. Rasmussen v. Robinson, 163 F.2d 732 (3d Cir. 1947); In re K., 9 1. & N. Dec.
121 (1960); In re H. & Y., 3 I. & N. Dec. 236 (1948).
66. I. & N. Act § 241(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4) (1970). See text accompanying
notes 3-11 supra. The statutory language in the judicial recommendation
against deportation provision reads: "The provisions of subsection a(4) of [§
1251] ... shall not apply if. . . ." I. & N. Act § 241(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4)
(1970). (emphasis added). The last sentence removes all possible doubt by pro-
viding that the recommendation "shall not apply in the case of any alien who is
charged with being deportable from the United States under subsection a(11) of
[§ 1251]." Id.
In several cases deportation has been grounded on id. § 241(a)(13), 8 U.S.C. §
1251(a)(13). In such cases the judicial recommendation against deportation has
been held ineffectual. See, e.g., Jew-Ten v. INS, 307 F.2d 832 (9th Cir. 1962); In re
Corral-Fragoso, 11 I. & N. Dec. 529 (1966); In re J.T., 6 I. & N. Dec. 823 (1955).
67. Statutory language making this remedy expressly unavailable in marijua-
na or narcotics cases was added by the Narcotic Control Act of 1956, Pub. L. No.
84-728, ch. 629, § 301(c), 70 Stat. 575. See also note 66 supra.
68. I. & N. Act § 241(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1970).
absolutely void.69 Because the recommendation must issue within
thirty days after passing of sentence,70 and because the notice defect
typically surfaces after the thirty-day period has expired, 71 these
defects are ordinarily impossible to correct.
The case of In re 1.72 is illustrative. The Board of Immigration
Appeals noted several "appealing factors" militating against depor-
tation: the alien had been only seventeen years old when the crime
was committed; he had been brought to this country at age sixteen by
his uncle; and his testimony had indicated "extenuating circum-
stances" surrounding commission of the crime." The sentencing
judge had accordingly issued a judicial recommendation against de-
portation. The Board held the recommendation invalid for lack of
proper notice to the INS, however, and because the time within
which to issue a new recommendation had expired, ordered the alien
deported.
The INS has promulgated regulations explaining how it should be
notified of the issuance of a judicial recommendation against depor-
tation. Notice may be provided by "the court, a court official, or by
counsel for the prosecution or the defense, at least 5 days prior to the
court hearing."7 4 Notice should be sent to the district director having
administrative jurisdiction over the place where the court is
situated. 5 Notice to the state and to the prosecution is also re-
quired, 6 although no indication is given of who represents "the
state" for this purpose.
Timely Issuance of the Recommendation
Even more crippling than failure to comply with timely notice
requirements has been failure to comply with timely issuance re-
quirements. The statutory language calls for the recommendation to
be made "at the time of first imposing judgment or passing sentence,
or within thirty days thereafter."7 The courts have interpreted the
69. United States ex rel. Piperkoff v. Esperdy, 267 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1959); In re
Plata, 14 . & N. Dec. 462 (1973); In re I., 6 . & N. 426 (1954). One case, apparently
standing alone, held that if a judicial recommendation against deportation is
issued without compliance with notice requirements, the recommendation may
have some limited effect; it could stand until the Service had made representa-
tions and the court had acted on them. See Haller v. Esperdy, 397 F.2d 211 (2d
Cir. 1968).
70. See text accompanying notes 77-86 infra.
71. This was true in all the cases cited in note 69 supra.
72. 6 I. & N. Dec. 426 (1954).
73. Id. at 428.
74. 8 C.F.R. § 241.1 (1976). One case so held even prior to the issuance of these
regulations. See In re P., 8 I. & N. Dec. 689 (1960).
75. 8 C.F.R. § 241.1 (1976).
76. I. & N. Act § 241(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1970).
77. Id.
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thirty-day limitation as a strict prerequisite, invalidating recom-
mendations issued after the period has expired. 8 It is no defense that
the alien, his or her counsel, and the sentencing judge were all
unaware of the provision until it was too late for the recommendation
to be issued-even if the judge would have issued it had there been
knowledge of such a remedy. 9
The thirty-day deadline refers to the time of making the recom-
mendation. In In re M.G. ,80 counsel requested the recommendation
by letter within the thirty-day period, but the sentencing judge, who
had been on vacation, issued it just after the period had expired. The
Board held the recommendation invalid for failure to comply with
the timing requirements of the statute.8 ' That decision has since been
followed.82
Some courts have attempted to circumvent the thirty-day limita-
tion by vacating the original sentence, imposing a new sentence, and
then issuing the recommendation within thirty days after the new
sentence was imposed. In such cases the issue arises whether the
recommendation was made within thirty days after "the time of first
imposing judgment or passing sentence,"83 as the statute requires.
More specifically, the issue is whether the time of first imposing
judgment is the original vacated judgment or the new judgment.
78. Velez-Lozano v. INS, 463 F.2d 1305 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Marin v. INS, 438 F.2d
932 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971); United States ex rel. Piperkoff v.
Esperdy, 267 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1959); United States ex rel. Klonis v. Davis, 13 F.2d
630 (2d Cir. 1926); Bruno v. United States, 336 F. Supp. 204 (W.D. Mo. 1971); Ex
parte Eng, 77 F. Supp. 74 (N.D. Cal. 1948); United States ex rel. Arcara v. Flynn,
11 F.2d 899 (W.D.N.Y. 1926).
79. Velez-Lozano v. INS, 463 F.2d 1305 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Marin v. INS, 438 F.2d
932 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971); Bruno v. United States, 336 F.
Supp. 204 (W.D. Mo. 1971). Cf. United States ex rel. Klonis v. Davis, 13 F.2d 630
(2d Cir. 1926) (counsel and the court had been unaware of the defendant's alien
status).
The case in which counsel could have requested a recommendation but failed
to should be contrasted with that in which no opportunity for such a request was
available. When an alien convicted by a court martial lost the opportunity to
request a recommendation because the members of the court had scattered
throughout the world before the 30-day period had expired, it was held that
deportation would not be permitted. Gubbels v. Hoy, 261 F.2d 952 (9th Cir. 1958).
Cf. Costello v. INS, 376 U.S. 120 (1964) (naturalized citizen convicted of tax
evasion nondeportable).
80. 5 I. & N. Dec. 531 (1953).
81. Id.
82. See, e.g., In re Tafoya-Gutierrez, 13 1. & N. Dec. 342 (1969).
83. I. & N. Act § 241(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1970) (emphasis added).
This issue can be resolved only by reference to the reason for
vacating the particular judgment. It has been consistently held that
when the sole basis for vacating the judgment was "to repair the
omission to make the statutory recommendation against deporta-
tion," the recommendation cannot be made more than thirty days
after the original judgment.8 4 When a judgment is vacated for some
reason other than to prevent deportation, however, the recom-
mendation may be issued within thirty days after the new judgment
is imposed. 5 In ascertaining the basis for vacating the judgment, it is
the reason given by the court, not the motive of the alien, which is
controlling.8"
DEPORTATION AS AN ADDITIONAL SANCTION FOR CRIMINAL CONDUCT:
WHEN IS IT JUSTIFIABLE?
Like any other people present in the United States, aliens are
required to obey all laws, and they are susceptible to criminal pun-
ishment when they fail to do so.87 As the preceding section demon-
strated, however, decisions of the sentencing judge often determine
whether the alien convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude will
be later subjected to the additional sanction of deportation. This
section will describe the effects of deportation on the lives of the
alien, the alien's family, and the general public, analyze the reasons
for deportation of convicted aliens, and examine the adverse side
effects of such deportations. The conclusion is that deportation as an
additional sanction for the alien convict should be used sparingly
and only after careful consideration of its appropriateness in indi-
vidual cases.
Effects of Deportation on the Alien, the Alien's Family,
and the General Public
Although recent public attention has focused on the vast numbers
of aliens entering the United States unlawfully,8 8 the deportation
provisions are not limited to the so-called illegal alien. While entry
84. United States ex rel. Piperkoff v. Esperdy, 267 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1959);
Bruno v. INS, 336 F. Supp. 204 (W.D. Mo. 1971); In re S., 9 1. & N. Dec. 613 (1962).
But see Sawkow v. INS, 314 F.2d 34 (3d Cir. 1963).
85. In re P., 9 I. & N. Dec. 293 (A.G. 1961). The language used in the cases cited
in note 84 supra indicates accord with this proposition. One excellent procedure
for vacating the original judgment when error is found in the proceedings is the
writ of error coram nobis. See generally Garcia, The Coram Nobis Writ in an
Immigration Context, 2 U.C.L.A. CHICANO L. REV. 92 (1975).
86. In re P., 9 I. & N. Dec. 293, 294 (1961).
87. Radich v. Hutchins, 95 U.S. 210 (1877).
88. See generally Chapman, A Look at Illegal Immigration: Causes and
Impact on the United States, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 34 (1975); Manulkin &
Maghame, A Proposed Solution to the Problem of the Undocumented Mexican
Alien Worker, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 42 (1975).
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without inspection is indeed one of the deportable offenses, 9 all
aliens-including those who were lawfully admitted to permanent
residence°--are subject to deportation for commission of specified
acts. This is true regardless of the length of time the alien has law-
fully resided in the United States.9 1
There appears to be a growing trend favoring the easing of civil
disabilities imposed on people convicted of crimes.2 The views ex-
pressed by many have focused on the loss of several specific rights,
such as the right to vote, to engage in selected occupations, to litigate,
to execute contracts, to serve on juries, and so forth. 3 What is far too
frequently overlooked is that the alien who is deported upon convic-
tion of a crime is deprived in one fell swoop of every one of these
rights. This is accomplished by the simple expedient of depriving him
of the one right which embraces all others: the right to be in the
United States.94
The deported alien is precluded not only from returning to the
United States to live, but also from returning even to visit family and
friends whom he or she has left behind. Moreover, this banishment
89. I. & N. Act § 241(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (1970).
90. The statutory language refers simply to "any alien in the United States."
Id. § 241(a), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a) (West Supp. 1977).
91. There is no statute of limitations on deportation-an omission which has
been sharply criticized. See, e.g., REPORT OF PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON IM-
MIGRATION & NATIONALITY, WHOM WE SHALL WELCOME (Da Capo Press Reprint
Ser. 1971) (reprint of the 1953 report of the President's Commission on Immigra-
tion and Naturalization); Gordon, The Need to Modernize Our Immigration
Laws, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 18-20 (1975); Maslow, Recasting OurDeportation
Laws: People for Reform, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 325 (1956).
92. See, e.g., Hearings on Priorities for Correctional Reform Before the
Subcomm. on National Penitentiaries of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. 319-25 (1971); NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMIN-
AL JUSTICE STANDARDS & GOALS, WORKING PAPERS FOR THE NATIONAL CONFER-
ENCE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CORRECTIONS 234 (1973), reproduced in S. KRANTZ,
THE LAW OF CORRECTIONS AND PRISONERS' RIGHTS 273 (1973); PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE
REPORT: CORRECTIONS 88-92 (1967), reproduced in S. KRANTZ, THE LAW OF CoR-
RECTIONS AND PRISONERS' RIGHTS 271-73 (1973); ALI MODEL PENAL CODE §
306.1(1) (1962); Special Project, The Collateral Consequences of a Criminal
Conviction, 23 VAND. L. REV. 929 (1970).
93. See authority cited note 92 supra.
94. One partial exception to this omission is contained in Special Project,
supra note 92, at 972-74, which gives passing mention to the possibility of depor-
tation.
95. Absent special permission from the Attorney General to reapply for ad-
mission, I. & N. Act § 212(a)(17), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(17) (1970), renders deported
aliens inadmissible. The general language of id. § 212(a), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)
(West Supp. 1977), bars the "admission" of excludable aliens; no distinction is
made between immigrants and visitors. But cf. id. § 212(d)(3)-(5), 8 U.S.C. §
is lifelong. 6
Some of the more severe effects of deportation are those felt by the
alien's family. Where family members are United States citizens or
permanent resident aliens, they must choose between leaving their
country and separating permanently from the family member being
deported. In the words of Justice Black: "[This alien] now loses his
job, his friends, his home, and maybe even his children, who must
choose between their father and their native country. '97
In many cases the deportee is the breadwinner of the family. His or
her absence may result in the family becoming dependent on Aid to
Families with Dependent Children98 or other welfare programs at
great emotional cost to the family and financial cost to the general
public.
When aliens are deported on certain designated grounds, including
all those based on criminal convictions, they lose all rights to Social
Security Old Age and Survivors payments, regardless of how much
they have contributed to the program.99 The loss of payments extends
not only to the deportee, but to any alien beneficiary who would have
been eligible to receive payments on the basis of the deportee's
earnings during any month in which the beneficiary is outside the
country.' The same is true of any lump-sum death benefits payable
to the beneficiary.'0 ' Thus, the alien beneficiary who wishes to re-
main with his or her spouse will have to give up both residence in the
United States and the right to future social security payments.
In light of the drastic effects of deportation, it is not surprising that
the courts have traditionally been vehement in expressing their views
of its harshness. Although deportation has been held not to constitute
punishment in the legal sense, 10 2 many judges and other authorities
1182(d)(3)-(5) (1970) (otherwise excludable aliens may be admitted under discre-
tionary waiver or parole provisions).
96. No time limit is prescribed by the provision barring previously deported
aliens. Id. § 212(a)(17), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(17). Compare this section with id. §
212(a)(16), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(16), which bars aliens who were excluded from the
United States within the preceding year.
97. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 533 (1954) (dissenting opinion).
98. The Aid to Families with Dependent Children Program is funded jointly
by the federal government and the states. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-610 (1970).
99. Id. § 402(n). The constitutionality of this provision was upheld by the
Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
100. 42 U.S.C. § 402(n)(1)(B) (1970).
101. Id. § 402(n)(1)(C).
102. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954); Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32 (1924). The
only case which has ever held contra is Lieggi v. INS, 389 F. Supp. 12 (N.D. Ill.
1975), and this case was overruled by the Seventh Circuit in an unpublished
opinion, Lieggi v. INS, No. 75-1393 (7th Cir. Jan. 27, 1976). For further discussion
of the Lieggi decision, see Recent Development, Deportation of an Alien for a
Marijuana Conviction Can Constitute Cruel and Unusual Punishment: Lieggi
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have suggested that as a practical matter it is at least similar to
punishment. 10 3 Strong language has been used by such eminent jur-
ists as Frankfurter, 10 4 Brandeis, 0 5 Hand,0 6 and others0 7 to describe
the severity of deportation.
It is apparent that the consequences of deportation on the lives of
the alien, the alien's family, and the general public can be staggering.
Because the sanction is so severe, it is suggested that the sentencing
judge, before making a decision which will render the alien convict
deportable, should consider the appropriateness of deportation in the
individual cases.
The Purposes of Deporting Alien Convicts
Many of the purposes underlying the laws requiring deportation of
alien convicts are similar to the purposes traditionally offered to
justify criminal punishment. As this discussion will show, these goals
overlap with the policies underlying the imposition of civil dis-
abilities on convicted offenders. They also overlap with the purposes
of deportation laws in general. All these purposes will now be ex-
amined to determine the extent to which they apply to deportation of
aliens convicted of criminal offenses.
Retribution
Retribution is the oldest theory of punishment,0 8 and probably the
most controversial.0 9 The emphasis is on punishment as the inflic-
v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Service, 389 F. Supp. 12 (N.D.
Ill. 1975), 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 454 (1975).
103. Justice Brewer once said in dissent: "Everyone knows that to be forcibly
taken away from home and family and friends and business and property, and
sent across the ocean to a distant land, is punishment, and that often times most
severe and cruel." Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 740 (1893).
James Madison has referred to deportation as "the severest of punishments."
Madison, Report on the Virginia Resolutions, 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 546, 555
(1800).
104. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954).
105. Ng Fung No v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922) ("may result in loss of...
all that makes life worth living.").
106. Di Pasquale v. Karnuth, 158 F.2d 878, 879 (2d Cir. 1947).
107. See, e.g., Gastelum-Quinones v. Kennedy, 374 U.S. 469,479 (1963); Jordan
v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 243 (1951) (dissenting opinion); Berdo v. INS, 432 F.2d
824, 848 (6th Cir. 1970).
108. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 21-25 (1972), reproduced in S.
KRANTZ, THE LAW OF CORRECTIONS AND PRISONERS' RIGHTS 30,32 (1973). See also
Special Project, supra note 92, at 1222.
109. See T. HONDERICH, PUNISHMENT: THE SUPPOSED JUSTIFICATIONS 30 (1969);
Armstrong, The Retributivist Hits Back, 70 MIND 471, 471-72, cited in Wang,
tion of suffering,'" and its validity rests on the theory that a person
who has harmed others should suffer.'' One commentator has view-
ed this suffering as intended to serve two distinct purposes: revenge,
which gratifies the public, and expiation of moral guilt, which is
designed to help the criminal "cleanse his soul.""' 2 It has also been
suggested that permitting revenge represses the criminal tendencies
of the public and helps to maintain respect for the law."'
Of all the theories of criminal punishment, retribution has been
perhaps the least accepted by modem correctional theorists.14 De-
spite the trend away from retribution as a goal of criminal punish-
ment, California has now adopted a sweeping revision of its criminal
corrections law with the enactment of the Uniform Determinate
Sentencing Act."' One provision of the new bill is especially signifi-
cant: "The Legislature finds and declares that the purpose of impris-
onment for crime is punishment.""' 6 Although that provision refers
only to imprisonment and not to other forms of criminal sanctions,
there can be no doubt that it reflects a legislative philosophy moving
in the direction of increased emphasis on retribution and reduced
emphasis on rehabilitation.
Regardless of whether retribution is a legitimate goal of imprison-
ment, its application to deportation as a sanction for criminal con-
duct is unjustifiable for at least three reasons. First, whenever aliens
have challenged deportation orders on the ground of cruel and un-
usual punishment,17 or on the theory that the procedural safeguards
ordinarily available in criminal proceedings should have been pro-
vided, the courts have consistently dismissed the claims with the
summary holding that deportation is not punishment." 8 The courts
cannot have it both ways. If deportation is not considered a form of
punishment for purposes of determining which constitutional rights
attach, a deportation order itself cannot then be justified on the
theory that it fulfills the need for punishment.
The Metaphysics of Punishment-An Exercise in Futility, 13 SAN DIEGOO L.
REV. 306, 311 & n.22 (1976).
110. See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, note 108 supra, reproduction at 32-33.
111. Id.
112. Wang, supra note 109, at 311-16.
113. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, note 108 supra, reproduction at 33.
114. See id., reproduction at 32. See also K. MENNINGER, THE HUMAN MIND 448
(1945); Wang, supra note 109, at 311-16; Special Project, supra note 92, at 1223.
115. 1976 Cal. Stats., ch. 1139. See Comment, Senate Bill 42 and the Myth of
Shortened Sentences for Calfornia Offenders: The Effects of the Uniform
Determinate Sentencing Act, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1176 (1977).
116. 1976 Cal. Stats., ch. 1139, § 273.
117. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
118. See cases cited note 102 supra.
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Second, the demand for retribution is already satisfied by the
imposition of the criminal punishment prescribed by the penal laws.
If these criminal sanctions were regarded by the legislature as suffi-
cient retribution for the citizen offender, there is no reason to think
the alien who commits the same offense deserves greater retribution.
Finally, deportation is far too extreme to be justified solely by the
need for retribution. Lifelong banishment as a penalty for criminal
conduct reached its peak in Czarist Russia.11 9 In modern times, using
it as a means of punishing deviant behavior is excessive and should
be rejected.
General Deterrence
One traditional theory underlying both criminal punishment and
the imposition of civil disabilities is general deterrence. The rationale
is that when one individual is punished, his or her suffering will deter
others from committing crimes out of fear of similar punishment. 12 0
The effectiveness of punishment in deterring the criminal conduct
of others varies with a number of factors. 2 ' Significantly, however,
the magnitude of the punishment is not nearly as important as the
probability of discovery and punishment. 2 In California a recent
legislative study found no evidence of a correlation between the
severity of a penalty and its general deterrent effect.'2 3 Because
making the criminal penalty harsher does little to deter crime,
adding civil disabilities-deportation, for instance-accomplishes
even less. 24 Not surprisingly, therefore, the incidence of crime in
states with many civil disability provisions is no less than in states
with few such provisions.
21
119. W. RECKLESS, THE CRIME PROBLEM 498 (4th ed. 1967).
120. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, note 108 supra, reproduction at 32 (goal of
punishment); Special Project, supra note 92, at 1222 (1970) (implicit rationale of
all sanctions).
121. For example, "[tihose who commit crimes under emotional stress ... or
who have become expert criminals ... are less likely than others to be deterred.
... Even apart from the nature of the crime [there are] such factors as their
social class, age, intelligence, and moral training." W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, note
108 supra, reproduction at 32.
122. Id.
123. CAL. ASSEMBLY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, DETERRENT EF-
FECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS (1968).
124. H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 40 (1968), cited in
Special Project, supra note 92, at 1223 n.347.
125. S. RUBIN, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTIONS 620-21 (1963).
This reasoning applies particularly to the civil disability of depor-
tation. Many attorneys are unfamiliar with the intricate body of
immigration law governing the effect of a criminal conviction on an
alien's status.126 It is unrealistic, therefore, to expect lay people,
particularly alien lay people who may be unfamiliar with customs in
the United States and even the English language, to have a sufficient
grasp of the technical intricacies of the deportation laws to identify
which conduct would lead to deportation and which would not. Even
if the alien population did have sufficient understanding of the law
pertaining to deportation, the preceding discussion illustrates that
the spectre of deportation is likely to have little deterrent effect
beyond that already provided by criminal penalties.
Specific Deterrence
Specific deterrence is another theory underlying both criminal
punishment and the imposition of civil disabilities. The rationale is
that the unpleasant nature of the sanction will impress upon the
offender the consequences of repeating deviant behavior. This theory
should be contrasted with the general deterrence theory which ex-
plores the effect one offender will have on others. 127
The specific deterrence theory is logically inapplicable to deporta-
tion. Because deportation is permanent, 128 it makes no sense to ask
whether the alien would be dissuaded by the prospect of a second
deportation from committing a future crime. Except in unusual
cases, 129 the alien will not be permitted to return lawfully, and thus
the issue of whether he or she will become a recidivist in the United
States does not arise. Even if the alien returns surreptitiously, the
possibility of deportation upon conviction of a subsequent offense
will constitute no deterrent at all, for upon apprehension he or she
would already be deportable for having entered without inspec-
tion."3 0
126. See generally text accompanying notes 1-86 supra for examples of cases
in which failings by counsel have resulted in deportation that could easily have
been avoided. See also text accompanying notes 193-200 infra.
127. See, e.g., J. ANDENAES, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE 175-76 (1974); W.
LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, note 108 supra, reproduction at 31 (specific deterrence
referred to as "prevention"); Wang, supra note 109, at 310.
128. I. & N. Act § 212(a)(17), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(17) (1970), bars from admission
an alien who has ever been deported from the United States.
129. The Attorney General is empowered to grant the previously deported
alien special permission to reapply for admission. Id. It should be noted this
provision merely permits application; it does not exempt the alien from any of
the qualitative and quantitative exclusionary provisions.
130. Id. § 241(a)(2), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a)(2) (West Supp. 1977).
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Incapacitation
It is plain from the preceding analysis that the decision to deport
an alien upon conviction of a crime cannot be justified by the theories
of retribution, general deterrence, or specific deterrence. There is one
theory, however, which may support such a decision, depending on
the circumstances of the individual case. The theory has been vari-
ously labeled incapacitation, 131 restraint,132 isolation, disablement,"3
and, in a slightly different context, the protection of the public."'
The incapacitation theory proposes that society has an interest in
protecting itself from people whose criminal conduct has proved
them to be dangerous. 35 Society protects itself by physically re-
straining the person to prevent commission of future criminal acts." 6
The theory depends upon a finding that the person being in-
capacitated is likely to commit such acts"'-that is, that the person
is simply too dangerous to be released into the community.
The most extreme form of incapacitation is the death penalty. More
typically, the form used is incarceration in a penal institution. These
types of incapacitation share a common characteristic: total removal
of the offender from society, either permanently or temporarily.
Other forms of incapacitation, by contrast, restrain the offender
only partially by preventing participation in specific activities. These
represent the so-called "civil disabilities," examples of which in-
clude loss of voting rights, loss of the right to hold public office, and
loss of selected employment opportunities." 8
Deportation seems to resemble most closely the total removal vari-
ety of incapacitation. Rather than being barred only from selected
activities, the deportee is excluded from the country entirely, and
such removal is permanent."19
131. Wang, supra note 109, at 309.
132. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, note 108 supra, reproduction at 31.
133. Id.
134. Special Project, supra note 92, at 1234, 1235 (protection of the public is
considered in the context of specific civil disabilities).
135. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, note 108 supra, reproduction at 31.
136. Wang, supra note 109, at 309.
137. H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 48-53 (1968).
138. State laws vary considerably in this area. For an excellent discussion of
the more common civil disabilities imposed on criminal offenders, see Special
Project, supra note 92, at 972-94.
139. See I. & N. Act § 212(a)(17), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(17) (1970). See also text
accompanying notes 95-96 supra.
It has been suggested that protection of the public is the only
justification for civil disabilities. 140 Regardless of whether so strong a
generalization is permissible with respect to all civil disabilities, it
seems clear that protection of the public is the only possible justifica-
tion for the particular civil disability of deportation. 141 The Supreme
Court has held that in enacting legislation to deport convicted aliens,
Congress was not seeking to increase the punishment for the crimes
committed but only "to rid the country of persons who had shown by
their career that their continued presence here would not make for
the safety or welfare of society.' 142
Civil disabilities have been imposed on criminal offenders since
ancient times, 143 and it is not suggested here that there is anything
inherently wrong with such sanctions. As one presidential commis-
sion has observed, bowever, problems arise when the concept is
misused.' The commission found many civil disability statutes to be
overly broad, concluding that a disability should be imposed only
after considering each individual case and examining which specific
forfeitures are needed and for how long.145 Another national advisory
commission has recommended the repeal of provisions requiring the
automatic imposition of civil disabilities in favor of laws drawn more
narrowly. 46 Even in DeVeau v. Braisted,'47 a leading Supreme Court
decision upholding the constitutionality of civil disabilities, the
Court was careful to emphasize that the restraint in question was
designed to guard against corruption only "in specified, vital
areas."1 48 One particular criticism which has been voiced relates to
the interminability of many statutes-the tendency to make the con-
vict suffer the disability long after the need has passed. 49
The overbreadth objection is strikingly applicable to deportation
of alien convicts. Regardless of the circumstances of the offense, and
140. Special Project, supra note 92, at 1235.
141. See text accompanying notes 108-38 supra.
142. Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 39 (1924).
143. See Damaska, Adverse Legal Consequences of Conviction and Their
Removal: A Comparative Study, 59 J. CRim. L.C. & P.S. 347, 351 (1968) (civil
disabilities originated in ancient Greece).
144. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 88-89 (1967), reproduced in S.
KRANTZ, THE LAW OF CORRECTIONS & PRISONERS' RIGHTS 271-73 (1973).
145. Id. at 89, reproduction at 273.
146. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS &
GOALS, WORKING PAPERS FOR THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
CORRECTIONS 234 (1973), reproduced in S. KRANTZ, THE LAW OF CORRECTIONS &
PRISONERS' RIGHTS 273-74 (1973).
147. 363 U.S. 144 (1960) (a New York statute barred convicted felons from
holding office in waterfront labor unions).
148. Id. at 158-59.
149. Special Project, supra note 92, at 1158-59.
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regardless of such factors as length of residence,150 family ties, and
other personal considerations, all aliens are subject to the deporta-
tion provisions relating to criminal convictions.' Having been ex-
pelled, the deportee is effectively precluded from exercising all
rights for which his or her presence is needed. With rare exceptions,
the removal is permanent. 1 2
In addition to being overly broad, the mass deportation of convict-
ed aliens is ineffective because it fails to incapacitate the offenders at
whom it is aimed. Once deported, the alien will be under powerful
pressures to try to return, and many will succeed. 53 Many aliens will
try to return out of fear of starvation.5 4 It is reasonable to assume
that the poverty which causes so many people to enter the United
States surreptitiously 5 5 will be an especially powerful force for those
aliens who have tasted relative economic prosperity on this side of
the border. In addition, family and other ties may prove to be an
irresistible lure to the deported alien.
Thus, the goal of protecting society is not well served by mass
deportation of convicted aliens. Attention must be focused on the
individual case and on the danger which deportation is intended to
obviate.
150. One provision does theoretically consider length of time in the United
States. I. & N. Act § 244(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(2) (1970), gives the Attorney
General the discretion to suspend the deportation of an alien who, inter alia,
has been present in the United States for 10 years following the commission of
the act rendering him or her deportable. By its own terms, however, the statute
cannot apply unless the Service waits at least 10 years to institute deportation
proceedings; and even then, the other elements are so onerous as to make the
provision virtually impossible to invoke when deportation is predicated on a
criminal conviction. See Comment, Suspension of Deportation: Illusory Relief,
14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 229 (1976).
151. See notes 88-91 and accompanying text supra.
152. I. & N. Act § 212(a)(17), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(17) (1970).
153. Estimates as to the number of undocumented aliens in the United States
vary. See Chapman, A Look at Illegal Immigration: Causes and Impact on the
United States, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 34, 35 (1975) (estimates 4-12 million); Manu-
1kin & Maghame, A Proposed Solution to the Problem of the Undocumented
Mexican Alien Worker, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 42, 43-45 (1975) (impossible to
estimate). Only a small proportion of this number is apprehended. Chapman, A
Look at Illegal Immigration: Causes and Impact on the United States, 13 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 34 (1975); Manulkin & Maghame, A Proposed Solution to the
Problem of the Undocumented Mexican Alien Worker, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 42,
45 n.10 (1975).
154. Manulkin & Maghame, A Proposed Solution to the Problem of the
Undocumented Mexican Alien Worker, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 42, 45 (1975).
155. Id.
Adverse Side Effects of Deporting Convicted Aliens
The preceding discussion demonstrated that deportation of the
convicted alien often fails to fulfill any legitimate purpose. In addi-
tion, its side effects can work affirmative harm in several ways.
First, in many cases deportation is contrary to the strong national
policy of preserving the family unit. This policy is expressed in many
provisions of the present immigration law." 6
Second, deportation could have the effect of destroying whatever
rehabilitative possibility might have existed. Still a cornerstone of
modern correctional theory, the rehabilitation approach is that
everyone benefits when the offender no longer desires or needs to
commit criminal offenses.5 7
Even in California, where the legislature has officially declared the
purpose of imprisonment for crime to be punishment, l5 8 rehabilita-
tion arguably plays an important role. It is important to note that this
statement of legislative intent refers only to imprisonment and not to
probation or suspended sentences, both of which have been expressly
retained.5 9 Furthermore, the new law provides for a maximum of
one year of parole following release from incarceration,1 6 apparently
reflecting the hope that the ex-convict will not commit further
crimes.
The President's Commission'6 ' has expressed the view that civil
disabilities impede the rehabilitative process. Rehabilitation can best
be effected by reintegrating the offender into society. 62 On a very
practical level, one who is separated from family and friends, par-
ticularly if he or she is sent to a country in which the economic
climate is poor, encounters severe obstacles to rehabilitation. In ad-
dition, like any other civil disability, 6 ' permanent deportation tells
156. For example, aliens with various family relationships are granted prefe-
rential status when applying for admission to the United States. See I. & N. Act §
201(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (1970); id. § 203(a), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1153(a) (West Supp.
1977). A family relationship may also be a prerequisite to a waiver of excludabil-
ity, id. § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (1970), or to a deportation offense, id. 99 241(f),
244(a), 244(e), 8 U.S.C. 99 1251(f), 1254(a), 1254(e). The residence period for natu-
ralization is ordinarily five years, id. § 316(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a), but this require-
ment is reduced to only three years for an alien who is married to a United
States citizen. Id. § 319(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1430(a).
157. See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, note 108 supra, reproduction at 32. See also
F. ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 28 (1964).
158. 1976 Cal. Stats., ch. 1139, § 273.
159. Id.
160. Id. § 278.
161. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 89 (1967), reproduced in S. KRANTZ,
THE LAW OF CORRECTIONS AND PRISONERS' RIGHTS 211-13 (1973).
162. Special Project, supra note 92, at 1218.
163. Id. at 1224.
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the alien that he or she can never again be trusted. These assaults on
the alien's self-respect, 164 when combined with the bitterness attend-
ing so harsh a sanction, can only hinder rehabilitation even further.
If the deported alien does attempt to return unlawfully, he or she will
be committing a felony,16 thus aggravating his or her criminal prob-
lems.
Third, even if deportation has no effect on the family unit or on the
alien's rehabilitation, it is submitted that such a cruel fate is ordi-
narily unwarranted. When a hunman being-whether an alien or a
citizen-violates a criminal law, punishment is justified. But once the
prescribed term is served, and the debt to society paid, there are few
cases which merit imposing the further indignity of permanent ban-
ishment from the resident country.
Finally, permanent banishment makes it that much more difficult
for the victim of the crime to secure restitution from the offender.
This is true not only because the offender will be removed from
federal and state jurisdiction, but also because removal may impede
his or her financial ability to compensate the victim.
Summary of the Purposes Underlying Deportation
of Convicted Aliens
The foregoing analysis illustrates that most of the traditional
theories underlying punishment do not apply to the sanction of de-
portation of convicted aliens. The only policy which can justify de-
portation of an alien who has already fulfilled the terms of his or her
criminal sentence is protection of the public by removing the alien
from society.
With respect to that policy, it is clear that judgments must be made
on an individual basis. Only in some cases will the complete and
permanent removal of an alien already criminally punished be essen-
tial to protecting the public against future harm. The specific factors
which could be considered in making these individualized judgments
will be the focus of part of the final section of this Article.
WHAT CAN BE DONE?
Congress, sentencing judges, and counsel can improve the system
of dealing with convicted aliens in a number of ways. The following
164. Id. at 1228.
165. I. & N. Act § 276, 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (1970).
discussion is generally limited to those methods closely related to the
sentencing process.
What Congress Can Do
The Problem of Deportation Because of a Marijuana
or Narcotics Conviction
Under existing law an alien can be deported on the basis of a
conviction of a single crime involving moral turpitude only if he or
she committed the crime within five years after entry and was sen-
tenced to at least a one year term. 6 6 By contrast, even in California"6 7
an alien can be deported on the basis of a marijuana or narcotics
conviction without regard to the time of commission or the sentence
imposed.168 Thus, the absurd situation can arise in which an alien is
deported on the basis of a conviction of possession of marijuana
under circumstances in which deportation would not have been pos-
sible had the conviction been for murder! 169
There are many sweeping ways, beyond the scope of this Article, in
which Congress could remedy this anomaly.70 One narrow approach,
however, would be to incorporate into the marijuana and narcotics
provision the same limitations presently part of the moral turpitude
provision: requirements that the crime have been committed within
five years after entry, and that a sentence of at least one year have
been imposed. Such a change would do much to alleviate the inequit-
able treatment of the two categories of deportable aliens.
The Problem of Deportation Upon Conviction of a
Moral Turpitude Crime
Under existing law one essential element of deportation pursuant
to section 1251(a)(4) is that the alien must be "sentenced to confine-
ment or confined. . . for a year or more."'' As discussed earlier, the
166. Id. § 241(a)(4), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a)(4) (West Supp. 1977).
167. New legislation in California reduced the maximum penalty for posses-
sion of less than one ounce of non-concentrated cannabis to a $100 fine. Incarc-
eration is no longer possible. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11357(b) (West
Supp. 1977). Nevertheless, such a conviction will still render an alien deportable
because it is a conviction of possession of marijuana for which no sentence to
confinement is required. I. & N. Act § 241(a)(11), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a)(11) (West
Supp. 1977).
168. I. & N. Act § 241(a)(11), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a)(11) (West Supp. 1977).
169. For example, if both crimes were committed more than five years after
entry, the murderer would not be deportable. The marijuana offender would be,
however, for no time requirement is imposed on such a charge. Id.
170. For example Congress could wholly repeal the provision of id., ren-
dering an alien deportable for a marijuana or narcotics conviction. Less ex-
treme measures would be to repeal it with respect to marijuana (but not narcot-
ics) offenses, or simply to remove possession of marijuana from its purview.
171. I. & N. Act § 241(a)(4), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a)(4) (West Supp. 1977).
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one-year period is measured by the sentence imposed, rather than by
the time actually served.17 2 Congress should amend this provision to
refer only to the time of actual incarceration.
Such an amendment would serve two purposes. Because the
rationale for deporting convicted aliens is to protect the public from
dangerous criminal offenders, the measure of time used should be the
one which most closely reflects the offender's condition at the time of
release. Time actually served will generally be a more accurate
barometer of this condition than will the sentence imposed, because
only the former can reflect the prisoner's progress toward rehabilita-
tion during the period of incarceration. This is true even under
California's new Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act because good
time credits up to one-third of the sentence are awarded for good
behavior during confinement. 73
In addition such an amendment would obviate the need to distin-
guish between suspension of imposition of sentence, which can save
the alien from deportation, and suspension of execution of sentence,
which cannot. 174 Deportation should not depend upon such sub-
tleties. Therefore, even if Congress declines this proposal, it should at
least amend the statute to provide expressly that suspension of either
imposition or execution of sentence will eliminate the sentence for
immigration purposes.
The Problem of Judicial Recommendation Against Deportation
The judicial recommendation against deportation should be
liberalized in several respects. First, the provision authorizing this
procedure is at present expressly limited to deportations predicated
on crimes involving moral turpitude. When deportation is based on a
marijuana or narcotics conviction, the recommendation is unavail-
able. 7 5 Congress should repeal the latter limitation for the same
reasons as those discussed above.176 To give the sentencing judge the
power to prevent the deportation of a convicted murderer, but to
allow no relief for one convicted of possession of marijuana, is non-
sensical.
172. See text accompanying notes 13-31 supra.
173. 1976 Cal. Stats., ch. 1139, § 276.
174. See text accompanying notes 13-21, supra.
175. I. & N. Act § 241(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1970).
176. For a similar recommendation see Gordon, The Need to Modernize Our
Immigration Laws, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 22-23 (1975).
Second, under existing law the judicial recommendation against
deportation is void if issued more than thirty days after the time of
first passing sentence. 7' This limitation should be repealed.1 8 When
the sentencing judge believes that a particular alien should not be
deported, his or her intent to spare the alien should not be frustrated
by failure to comply with so needless a technicality. Congress should
recognize the practical fact that most lawyers and most judges-
particularly those accustomed to state rather than federal court pro-
cedure-simply do not know that the recommendation against de-
portation procedure exists. 7 9 On many occasions it may not be until
deportation proceedings are instituted and an attorney specializing
in immigration law is retained that the sentencing judge is first
informed of this remedy. If the judge is willing to recommend against
deportation at that time, there is no reason to prevent him or her
from so doing.
Alternatively, if Congress is unwilling to repeal the thirty-day
limit entirely, it could vest the sentencing judge with the discretion to
waive it "in the interest of justice" on an ad hoc basis, provided the
required notice is given to all interested parties.
Third, under existing law, failure to satisfy the notice requirements
renders the recommendation ineffectual. 8 ' Yet, if the alien raises the
recommendation as a defense in subsequent deportation proceedings,
the INS will learn of it at that time. The notice requirements should
therefore be amended to provide that a recommendation issued with-
out proper notice will nevertheless be valid until such time as the INS
makes representations to the sentencing judge and the judge changes
his or her mind.' 8 ' If the judge does not change his or her mind after
hearing the INS's objections, there is no reason to set aside the
recommendation merely because notice was not provided at the out-
set. This amendment will be especially significant if Congress de-
clines to enact the aforementioned proposal to eliminate the thirty-
day limitation, for the thirty-day limit will ordinarily have expired
by the time deportation proceedings are instituted.
Fourth, the current provision requires notice to the "interested
state, the Service, and prosecution authorities."' 82 The reference to
the "interested state" is confusing and unnecessary, and therefore
177. I. & N. Act § 241(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1970). See also text accompanying
notes 77-86 supra.
178. For a similar recommendation see Gordon, The Need to Modernize Our
Immigration Laws, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 23-24 (1975).
179. See text accompanying notes 68-76 supra.
180. Id.
181. Cf. Haller v. Esperdy, 397 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1968) (same result accom-
plished judicially).
182. I. & N. Act § 241(b), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1251(b) (West Supp. 1977).
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should be deleted. The interests of the state are already sufficiently
protected by notice to the prosecution.
The Problem of Permanent Inadmissibility
Congress should amend the provision rendering a once deported
alien permanently inadmissible.'8 3 The legislation should provide
that aliens deported on the basis of criminal convictions can reapply
for admission after a specified time, provided they can show absten-
tion from criminal activity during that period.
What Sentencing Judges Can Do
At this stage, one point must be emphasized: When an alien is
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, the action of the
sentencing judge is ordinarily' dispositive of the deportation issues
which will later arise. Therefore, by either action or inaction, the
sentencing judge usually is deciding whether the alien being sentenc-
ed is to be deported. It is sensible to permit the sentencing judges to
make such decisions since they, more than anyone else, will be the
authority most familiar with the defendants and the circumstances of
the offense. The crucial point is that the judge should consciously
consider whether the alien is a person who should be deported.
Whenever the person being sentenced is an alien whose conviction
might subject him or her to subsequent deportation, the sentencing
judge should make two major decisions. He or she should first decide
whether that alien should be deported. If it is decided that deporta-
tion is unwarranted, the judge should then determine whether there
is any possible sentence which would punish the alien appropriately
without resulting in deportation.
Should the Alien Be Deported?
A decision that the alien should be deported should not be reached
solely because the crime committed was a serious one. By definition,
any crime involving moral turpitude is serious. That Congress in-
183. Id. § 212(a)(17), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(17).
184. The word ordinarily is used because some situations exist in which his
or her decision will not affect the alien's immigration status. One such instance
is that in which the alien has been convicted of only one crime involving moral
turpitude committed more than five years after entry. Id. § 241(a)(4), 8 U.S.C.A. §
1251(a)(4). Even then, the sentencing judge's decision on whether to issue a
judicial recommendation against deportation could later become important if
the alien is subsequently convicted of a second serious crime. See id.
tended a certain measure of compassion even when a crime involving
moral turpitude has been committed is evident from its enactment of
the provision authorizing the judicial recommendation against de-
portation, which applies only to crimes involving moral turpitude.
As demonstrated in the previ6us section, the only justification for
deporting an alien on the basis of a criminal conviction, after he or
she has served a criminal sentence, is to protect society. Therefore, as
a general rule, an alien should not be deported on this ground unless
his or her presence in the United States poses an unacceptably high
risk of danger to the general public. To ascertain whether such a risk
is present, the sentencing judge should consider all relevant factors,
including the alien's prior record, the circumstances of the offense,
and the alien's remorse.
If substantial risk of recidivism is perceived, the question of
whether that risk is unacceptable should be resolved only after
weighing all competing considerations. One extremely important
factor in such a decision should be the alien's family ties. If the alien
has a spouse, parent, or child who is a United States citizen or a
lawfully admitted permanent resident alien, then deportation should
not result unless the risk of danger is unusually high. Such other
factors as several years of residence in the United States and other
community ties similarly militate against a sanction as harsh as
deportation.
How Can Deportation Be Avoided?
If the sentencing judge has determined that deportation of a par-
ticular alien convicted of a single crime involving moral turpitude is
not justified, he or she may wish to avoid the one-year sentence
requirement. The judge can do this in several ways.
Under California's Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act, the
judge retains the authority to grant probation.18 As a condition of
probation, the judge may sentence the alien to county jail.186 If he or
she does so, one way to avoid deportation would be simply to order
the alien confined for less than one year. Another way would be to
refrain from sentencing the alien to county jail entirely and instead
to find a way in which the convicted alien could contribute to the
community. It may be possible, for example, to require the alien to
speak to neighborhood youths, educating them about the legal conse-
quences of a criminal conviction for an alien. If the offender qual-
ifies, a California judge can avoid the one-year sentence element by
185. 1976 Cal. Stats., ch. 1139, § 273.
186. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.1 (West 1970). See also 1976 Cal. Stats., h.1139, §
273 (The new Act retains this option).
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ordering the alien committed to the California Youth Authority. 8 7 In
federal court -the same is true of sentences under the Federal Youth
Corrections Act.18 8 In all these cases, it is critical that the judge
suspend imposition of sentence, rather than mere execution. 89
If the judge feels that none of these options would be appropriate,
he or she may sentence the alien in the same manner as any other
individual convicted of the same offense, but the judge may prevent
deportation by issuing the judicial recommendation against deporta-
tion. This recommendation should be liberally granted. There are no
substantive statutory prerequisites other than the limitation to
crimes involving moral turpitude. 19 Compliance with the procedural
requirements, while crucial,' 9' is easy. The judge need only be sure
that notice is given to the INS in accordance with its regulations, 9 2
that the prosecution and state authorities are also notified in ad-
vance, and that the recommendation is issued within thirty days after
passing sentence.
The recommendation should not be lost merely because the defense
never revealed the convict's alienage. The sentencing judge should
therefore act sua sponte in asking the convict whether he or she is an
alien or a citizen. An explanation about why the question is being
asked should be offered. If the defendant is an alien, the judge should
request counsel to make a presentation at the sentencing hearing on
the issues of whether deportation should, and how it could, be
averted.
What Counsel Can Do
The case law is replete with instances in which the failings of
defense counsel have deprived alien criminal defendants of remedies
which would have prevented their subsequent deportations. In one
remarkable case, United States v. Parrino, an alien was deported
187. See text accompanying notes 45-49 supra.
188. See text accompanying notes 38-44 supra.
189. See text accompanying notes 13-21 supra.
190. I. & N. Act § 241(b), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1251(b) (West Supp. 1977).
191. See text accompanying notes 59-86 supra.
192. 8 C.F.R. § 241.1 (1976).
193. 212 F.2d 919 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 840 (1954) (alien not permitted
to withdraw guilty plea after learning of deportation consequence). For similar
holdings, see Michel v. United States, 507 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v.
Santelises, 476 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Sambro, 454 F.2d 918
(D.C. Cir. 1971). But see United States v. Shapiro, 222 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1955)
(lone contra holding).
after pleading guilty to a charge which his attorney-the former
Commissioner of the INS-had assured him would not lead to depor-
tation.
The Velez-Lozano case discussed earlier 94 is also illustrative. The
alien pleaded guilty without being advised by his attorney that de-
portation could follow as a consequence. Because the offense was
trivial and the offender non-dangerous, the sentencing judge sus-
pended sentence. The attorney failed to advise the judge, however,
that only suspension of imposition of sentence would help the alien,
and the appellate court held that the judge's suspension of execution
of sentence was to no avail. Finally the court tried to issue a judicial
recommendation against deportation, but it too was invalid for fail-
ure to meet the thirty-day time limitation. Despite the clear intent of
the sentencing judge,'95 counsel's repeated failures to advise the
judge of the technical problems resulted in the deportation of the
alien client.
United States ex rel. Piperkoff v. Esperdy'96 is another classic
example of a deportation attributable to bungling counsel. The attor-
ney failed to request a judicial recommendation within the thirty day
statutory period. Because of other failings by counsel, the court was
able to vacate the original judgment and enter a new sentence. At the
second sentencing hearing, a judicial recommendation against de-
portation was finally issued. It was held defective, however, because
counsel had failed to comply with the requirement of prior notice to
the INS. The court vacated the second judgment because of this
failure, entered a third sentence, and tried again to issue the recom-
mendation, this time with proper notice. That final attempt was also
frustrated because it came more than thirty days after the second
vacated judgment. 7 The alien was deported.
Such failings are inexcusable. In an adversary system it is the
obligation of the attorney to assure the client the best defense pos-
sible under the law. This obligation requires adequate preparation for
the case. 9 8 The attorney's duty "is to represent his client zealously
194. See text accompanying notes 15-16 supra.
195. The sentencing judge wrote a letter to the Attorney General explaining
he had suspended the sentence because the alien had been remorseful and
capable of rehabilitation. He then added: "Had the statutory requirement been
called to my attention at the time of sentencing, I would have been glad to have
written to you recommending against deportation, within 30 days." 463 F.2d at
1309.
196. 267 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1959).
197. The 30-day period would have begun with the third sentence if the vaca-
tion had been for some purpose other than to prevent deportation. See text
accompanying notes 83-86 supra.
198. See A.B.A. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 6-101(A)(2) (1974).
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within the bounds of the law." '199 When he or she fails to invoke
remedies expressly provided by Congress, the duty is breached.
Lack of familiarity with immigration law does not excuse this
neglect. When a lawyer accepts employment in a field of law in which
he or she lacks previous experience, a duty arises to engage in what-
ever further study will be needed.0 0
Any attorney representing an alien criminal defendant should be-
come familiar with the deportation consequences of criminal convic-
tions and sentences. In most cases the procedures for invoking the
available remedies are simple ones. Failure to request the remedy
seasonably, however, can lead to complex and unnecessary legal
issues. More importantly, the damage will often be irreparable.
CONCLUSION
When a person is convicted of violating a criminal law, appropriate
punishment should be imposed. However, the convict-whether a
citizen or an alien-is a human being. There is growing sentiment
that once the debt to society is paid by fulfilling the terms of the
criminal sentence, the alien should be permitted to begin rebuilding
his or her life. Permanent banishment from the country in which he
or she resides is not conducive to such rebuilding. It should therefore
be mandated only when the alien's presence after release from in-
carceration would pose an unusually serious danger to the general
public-and only after all circumstances of the individual case have
been considered. Judge Learned Hand, in a case in which the sen-
tencing judge had failed to issue a timely recommendation against
deportation, rightly labeled the ensuing deportation a "cruel and
barbarous result" and a "national reproach. ' 20 1
Many aspects of a criminal prosecution influence whether an alien
will be subsequently deported. They include the plea-bargaining,
trial, sentencing, and even post-sentencing stages. This Article has
dealt with those aspects related to sentencing. Ideas have been pro-
posed about how Congress, sentencing judges, and counsel can im-
prove the existing state of the art in this area. It is hoped that prompt
action will be taken to rectify the enormous failings of the present
system.
199. Id., EC 7-1.
200. Id., EC 6-3.
201. United States ex rel. Klonis v. Davis, 13 F.2d 630, 631 (2d Cir. 1926).

